The (Intellectual Property Law and) Economics of Innocent Fraud:
The IP & Development Debate

Abstract:
This note/essay examines the evidence on the effect of stronger IP laws introduced during
the process of international IP law harmonization initiated by the TRIPS agreement, on
the economic development of developing countries. It has been argued by proponents of
harmonization that stronger IP laws will provide a needed boost to the economic
development of developing (and even least-developed) countries. Critics of
harmonization have argued that stronger IP laws will have the opposite effect. What has
been largely overlooked in this debate is the strength of the evidentiary foundation upon
which the arguments of both sides depend. Many of the economic arguments of both
sides borrow background assumptions from the neoclassical school of economics, a
paradigm that has lately come under intense criticism and scrutiny from both current
students of economics and greatly respected economists. After briefly discussing the
crisis of neoclassical economics and providing a demonstration of the deficiencies in the
application of neoclassical modeling techniques to the IP & development question, I
examine some of the latest empirical evidence on the question, and then examine the
history of the relationship between IP & development. The conclusion of this
examination is that empirical evidence does not clearly support either side; rather, a great
deal more analysis is required, especially analysis of what one author calls “natural
experiments.” These natural experiments are to be found in history, and the historical
relationship of IP & development clearly demonstrates, if anything, an inverse
relationship between strong IP laws and successful economic development. In light of
this result, John Kenneth Galbraith’s phrase “conventional wisdom” is an apt description
of the position, well- represented in the community of American IP legal scholars, that the
international harmonization of IP laws will help the economies of developing nations to
grow.
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I would like to dedicate this note to the late, great economist, John Kenneth Galbraith. His wit,
perspective, and depth of understanding will be sorely missed. In the event that my attempt to pay homage
by borrowing some elements of Galbraith’s style and opinion and applying it to the intellectual property
and development debate is regarded by readers as a failure, I should nonetheless hope to succeed at
instilling a sense of loss at the passing of my inspiration; surely, no matter the reader’s opinions on the
issue, he would have been a more capable writer on the subject. In that case, to honor in the breach would
be to honor.
I would like to thank Professors Barton Beebe of the Cardozo School of Law, Ha-Joon Chang of
Cambridge University and Akalemwa Ngenda of the University of Kent Law school for the assistance they
provided in researching this note; Lynette Dasanayake, Orobola Fasehun, Todd Larson, Anne Mellett and
Rama Rao of the WIPO coordination office for the wonderful experience I will never forget which they
afforded me during the course of my internship there; and Deepika D’Souza and Kamil Hamied for
sparking my interest in the law of intellectual property.

“Dealt with in this essay is how, out of the pecuniary and political pressures and fashions
of the time, economics and larger economic and political systems cultivate their own
version of truth. This last has no necessary relation to reality. No one is especially at
fault; what is convenient to believe is greatly preferred.... It is what serves, or is not
adverse to, influential economic, political, and social interest. Most progenitors of what
I here intend to identify as innocent fraud are not deliberately in its service... There is no
serious sense of guilt; more likely, there is self-approval.” 2
- John Kenneth Galbraith, The Economics of Innocent Fraud
“[I]n the interpretation of all social life, there is a persistent and never-ending
competition between what is right and what is merely acceptable. In this competition,
while a strategic advantage lies with what exists, all tactical advantage is with the
acceptable... Numerous factors contribute to the acceptability of ideas. To a very large
extent, of course, we associate truth with convenience – with what most closely accords
with self-interest and personal well-being or promises best to avoid awkward effort or
unwelcome dislocation of life... But perhaps most important of all, people most approve
of what they best understand... [A] vested interest in understanding is more preciously
guarded than any other treasure. It is why men react, not infrequently with something
akin to religious passion, to the defense of what they have so laboriously learned.
Familiarity may breed contempt in some areas of human behavior, but in the field of
social ideas it is the touchstone of acceptability... I shall refer to these ideas henceforth
as the Conventional Wisdom.” 3
- John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society

I
At a recent joint WIPO/UNITAR seminar on intellectual property for UN
delegates unfamiliar with the subject, I heard a distinguished professor introduce his
discussion of the law of patents with a quote from Mark Twain: “a country without a
patent office and good patent laws [is] just a crab, and [can’t] travel any way but
sideways and backways.” This use of Mark Twain’s wit to praise patents deserved a
qualifier that was absent, however, from the professor’s discussion. In the book this
quote was taken from, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court, the country newly
granted “a patent office and good patent laws” does travel a few steps forwards – but then
many more steps backwards and sideways. Samuel Clemens’ larger point was that
technology (and the requisite laws to facilitate its development) is but a tool, and one that
2
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cannot by itself solve humanity’s gravest problem: the prevalence of societies in which
people do not think for themselves.
Intellectual property (IP)4 law can be, in the words of director-general of the
World Intellectual Property Organization Kamil Idris, a “power tool” for economic
development.5 Yet if unthinkingly applied according to the prevailing conventional
wisdom, IP protection can be a power tool in the hands of a child: destructive rather than
creative.
There exists today a lively debate between those who believe that maximal IP
protection should be extended throughout the world regardless of differing stages of
national development, and those who believe that such an imposition would be harmful,
if not deadly, to developing economies and societies. In this note, I will attempt to
reexamine the debate, to show how much or little is actually known, and, hopefully,
expose innocent fraud wherever it may be uncovered.
II
J.K. Galbraith introduced the phrase “conventional wisdom” into the language,
and much of his writings were devoted to exposing as popular falsehood the conventional
economic wisdom of the times. He would be happy to follow the events occurring today
within the economics academy. Neoclassical economics is experiencing what many of its
critics consider a crisis, leading eventually to a paradigm shift within economics.6 Critics

4

By IP, I mean patent, copyright, and trademark interchangeably, where appropriate. The vast majority of
the research I cite focuses on patents. It has been suggested that commentators should disaggregate
different forms of IP – an important point for some contexts, especially research endeavors, but not here.
But see Michael P. Ryan, Knowledge-Economy Elites, the International Law of Intellectual Property and
Trade, and Economic Development, 10 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 271, 302 (2002). Ryan, who cites only
those studies that support his conclusion that stronger IP laws will aid development, calls the contrary view
“the conventional wisdom … fundamentally flawed as a matter of social science and recommends equally
flawed policy prescriptions.” Id., at 272. Had he been aware of it, John Kenneth Galbraith would have
smiled at this useage of the phrase he coined:
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include Milton Friedman (“economics has become increasingly an arcane branch of
mathematics rather than dealing with real economic problems"7), Ronald Coase
(“[e]xisting economics is a theoretical system which floats in the air and which bears
little relation to what happens in the real world”8), and Joseph Stiglitz (“[t]hat
[neoclassical] models prevailed, especially in America's graduate schools, despite
evidence to the contrary bears testimony to a triumph of ideology over science”9).
Eventual obsolescence seems almost inexorable, whether the decline of neoclassical
economics follows the Kuhnian paradigm of scientific revolutions, loses a Popperian
intellectual battle at the hands of a less anomaly-ridden approach, or simply provides an
instantiation of the Planck principle.10 Perhaps a consistent string of economic failures
resulting from the application of neoclassical theory will do the theory in. Some blame
economists of the neoclassical school at the International Monetary Fund for the East
Asian crisis and Russia’s disastrous transition to a capitalist economy.11 Apologists for
the IMF and the economic orthodoxy may retort that such a stance is analogous to
blaming the physician for one’s the disease, but even this would seem justifiable if the
severity of the disease increased sharply following treatment: the patient is liable to
suspect that the leeches applied sucked out more lifeblood than disease.
of a 2000 French student petition, which founded the “Post-Autistic Economics” movement. In conclusion,
he writes:
A scientific economics … must be a diverse, pragmatic, applied enterprise with an open
discussion of controversial questions … [T]he core arrangement of theoretical
propositions in economics also remains among the questions worthy of debate and
therefore of inclusion in the curriculum of economics, since a theoretical framework
cannot be debated unless it is first properly taught. The pretense that a single axiomatic
framework can be, or has been, built up for all time from first principles and verified by
observation – the stated contention of the counter-appeal – merely reveals how far
removed from the reality of our profession that statement is. It also constitutes the best
evidence that the French students are correct in their appeal for fundamental reform.
7
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struggles, says, ‘An important scientific innovation rarely makes its way by gradually winning over and
converting its opponents: it rarely happens that Saul becomes Paul. What does happen is that its opponents
gradually die out, and that the growing generation is familiarized with the ideas from the beginning ….’”
(quoting MAX PLANK, PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS, 97 (W.W. Norton and Company Inc. 1936))).
11
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If today a mother were to speak about her parenting troubles, and suggest as their
most likely explanation that her 6-year-old son subconsciously desires to have intercourse
with her and frets about the possibility that his jealous father, her husband, might cut off
the boy’s genitals – a fate, in the young boy’s mind, that his penis-less sister surely had
already suffered – the woman might be considered mad. Yet, during most of the last
century this same woman would have more likely been considered abnormal only in the
sense that she was more intelligent and well-read than average. Freudian psychoanalysis
was the dominant paradigm, with a few conceptual shifts over time, in American
psychiatry for most of the 20th century.12 Today it has been much discredited, and
relegated to a niche.13 Is the same fate in store for neoclassical economics?
“Such a doctrine can accrue any number of theoretical niceties as it continually
trims its sails to the Zeitgeist, but is can never confront the nullity of its knowledge
claims, since to do so would be institutional suicide.”14 Written about psychoanalysis,
this same indictment is serviceable in application to neoclassical economics. Freudian
psychoanalysis has since been relegated to a niche within the academy and in psychiatric
practice, as other schools of thought less contradicted by empirical evidence gained
sway.15 For an emerging minority of heterodox economists, the neoclassical school, with
its fondness for mathematical abstractions underpinned by absurd, though standard,
assumptions,16 and record of failures in application,17 too seems destined for the dustbin.
12
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listed as features of the school of psychoanalysis. CREWS, supra note 13, at 61-62. Many would borrow
this description for application against neoclassical economics.
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See, e.g., WILLIAM D. SPAULDING, MARY E. SULLIVAN & JEFFREY S. POLAND, TREATMENT AND
REHABILITATION OF SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS, at 12-13 (The Guilford Press 2003).
16
I am here referring to the practice of neoclassical economists of making certain assumptions (which have
become standard), such as markets being in equilibrium, all economic actors being rational, utilitymaximizing individuals, etc., around which mathematical models are designed that purport to shed light on
really existing economies. To the uninitiated this seems as obvious folly, so neoclassical economists
defend the practice by recourse to the “F-twist,” brainchild and namesake of Milton Friedman. Friedman’s
defense was that economic theories are unrealistic by nature of the fact that they abstract the crucial
elements of the phenomena to be explained and ignore the complicated mass of extraneous surrounding
circumstances. So long as a theory produces accurate predictions, its seemingly absurd starting
assumptions are of no importance.

III
I introduced my analysis of the IP and development debate with a brief discussion
of failed and failing paradigms – Freudian psychoanalysis and neoclassical economics –
not to attack proponents on either side of the IP and development debate, but rather to
suggest a loosening of the dogmatic certitude with which both sides hold their opinions.18
Humans are fallible, and academic or institutional esteem is no guarantee of truth.
Neoclassical economics has been revealed as an ideology (both in the original
sense, and, especially, according to Karl Marx’s definition19) with scientific pretensions.
Yet neoclassical economics’ present dominance evinces an uncomfortable link between
its use and utility for ideological justification, and its proponents’ belief that they are
uninfluenced by anything other than an intellectual desire for scientific truth.
This link need not carry with it any moral disapproval, as a memetic perspective
demonstrates.20 At its core, the memetic perspective seeks to explain the emergence and

Philosopher Alan Musgrave produced an incisive analysis and critique of the use of such assumptions,
delineating three categories thereof: negligibility assumptions, which state that an aspect of reality has no
significant effect on the phenomenon under investigation; domain assumptions, which specify the
conditions under which a theory will apply; and heuristic assumptions, which are known to be false but are
made as a first step towards a more general theory. Neoclassical economists use and misuse these
assumptions heavily in designing theory, and stray far beyond their inherent limitations. For example, the
use of domain assumptions in the creation of a mathematical model necessitates the conclusion that the
model is only applicable in the domain whose reality the assumptions made accurately describe;
effectively, nowhere. See STEVE KEEN, DEBUNKING ECONOMICS, 148-155 (St. Martin’s Press 2002).
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http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/wholeissues/issue32.htm (July 2005). Here, the case is made that
intellectual property laws are contrary to the prescriptions of neoclassical economics, despite the fact that
few neoclassical economists have attacked the IP system with the same ferocity reserved for tariffs or other
forms of protectionism. Although there may be few such neoclassical economists, but they are capable of
raising a firestorm of controversy. See Douglas Clement, Creation Myths, Reason Online, available at
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and Economic Development, 56 Monthly Rev., available at
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MEME (Free Press 2002), KATE DISTIN, THE SELFISH MEME (Cambridge University Press 2004), among
others. But see generally for critical perspectives, DARWINIZING CULTURE (Robert Aunger, ed., Oxford
University Press 2001). Memetics is not a wholly original perspective; it is a modern graft, influenced by

existence of culture, ideas, and the way humans create, modify and use them, without
reference to a Creator. Instead, the evolutionary paradigm21 is used to explain the
emergence and development of these complex phenomena. ‘Memes’ are ideas that
compete for survival and propagation in human brains according to the evolutionary
paradigm, in a manner loosely analogous to the way genes can be said to compete for
survival and propagation. Ideas that confer an advantage upon their subjects tend to outreplicate less ‘fit’ ideas. For example, the idea of cooking meat might tend to spread
more widely than the idea of eating meat raw, since the latter would tend to expose its
practitioners to life-threatening parasites, and would therefore have a lesser chance to
spread. Also, since the environment of evolutionary adaptation for memes is a human
mind already filled with other ideas, to be successfully adopted new ideas must be to
some degree in harmony with those already present and shaping the environment. The
idea of ‘email’ would not successfully spread to human minds without an understanding
of computers and the internet. So too, the idea of advocating radical wealth redistribution

the modern synthesis of Darwinism and the discovery of DNA, appended to a tree with very deep roots.
For instance, see, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE, 169-171 (Vintage 1974).
21
Philosopher Daniel Dennett presents the evolutionary paradigm as an “universal acid,” a substance
capable of dissolving anything attempting to contain it, from a paper bag to stainless steel. The
evolutionary paradigm is a universal acid capable of eating “through just about every traditional concept,
[leaving] in its wake a revolutionized world-view, with most of the old landmarks still recognizable, but
transformed in fundamental ways.” DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA, 63 (Simon &
Schuster 1995). Dennett continues:
Darwin’s idea had been born as an answer to questions in biology, but it threatened to
leak out, offering answers – welcome or not – to questions in cosmology (going in one
direction) and psychology (going in the other direction). If redesign could be a mindless,
algorithmic process of evolution, why couldn’t that whole process itself be the product of
evolution, and so forth, all the way down? And if mindless evolution could account for
the breathtakingly clever artifacts of the biosphere, how could the products of our own
“real” minds be exempt from an evolutionary explanation? Darwin’s idea thus also
threatened to spread all the way up, dissolving the illusion of our own authorship, our
own divine spark of creativity and understanding.
Much of the controversy and anxiety that has enveloped Darwin’s idea ever since can be
understood as a series of failed campaigns in the struggle to contain Darwin’s idea within
some acceptably “safe” and merely partial revolution. Cede some or all of modern
biology to Darwin, perhaps, but hold the line there! Keep Darwinian thinking out of
cosmology, out of psychology, out of human culture, out of ethics, politics, and religion
[and economics]! In these campaigns, many battles have been won by the forces of
containment: flawed applications of Darwin’s idea have been exposed and discredited,
beaten back by the champions of the pre-Darwinian tradition. But new waves of
Darwinian thinking keep coming. They seem to be improved versions, not vulnerable to
the refutations that defeated their predecessors, but are they sound extensions of the
unquestionably sound Darwinian core idea, or might they, too, be perversions of it, and
even more virulent, more dangerous, than the abuses of Darwin already refuted?

would have difficulty taking hold in Bill Gates’ mind, as would the idea of leveraging
monopoly power in the mind of a pauper.22
This memetic interpretation of ideas and ideology might give pause to antagonists
in the IP and development debate. Both sides should ask themselves: to what extent is
that which is believed believed as a result of dispassionate, thorough examination of facts
and opposing arguments – and to what extent is that which is believed believed merely
because it fits comfortably with what is already believed? The demonstrable persistence
of “conventional wisdom” in the face of contradictory facts should force us to reexamine
the evidence upon which – we presume – our opinions on the IP & development debate
have been formed.
IV
One of the ineluctable weaknesses of the study of economics is that replicable
experimentation is not available to prove or disprove most economic hypotheses.23
Scientific ethics would prevent us even if it were not already simply impossible to run a
controlled experiment wherein the effects of myriad independent variables could be
eliminated and only the effect of IP protection upon the dependent variable of economic
growth could be isolated. Regardless, control-group experimentation to verify or falsify
economic hypotheses like the one under discussion now – whether international
harmonization24 of IP law will produce gains for developing economies – is simply
unavailable for use.
This seems an obvious point, but its consequences are often overlooked. One
interesting example is that if there were a trial in a U.S. court over the question of the
economic effects of international IP law harmonization on the developing world, much of
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In this instance, the maxim “tell me what a man owns, and I will tell you what he thinks,” is not far off.
There is, however, the burgeoning experimental economics movement, the explanatory scope of which,
one hopes, will continue to grow. See generally THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (John H.
Kagel & Alvin E. Roth ed., Princeton University Press 1997). “Among the more amusing results that have
come out of experimental economics are those concerning altruism and selfishness. It appears (at least in
experimental situations) that experimental subjects are not as selfish as economists have hypothesized-except for one group - the economists themselves.” Stiglitz supra note 7. Other heterodox approaches
attempt to minimize this weakness in different ways. See Post Autistic Economics Network supra note 5.
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terms of the overall international changes to IP law that harmonization would effect, I will use the latter
since it is possibly more value-neutral than “strengthening.”
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the evidence economists woulduse to make their case might be inadmissible.25
Economics is hamstrung by the nature of its pursuit; complex systems like economies are
terribly difficult to model with a level of accuracy sufficient to confidently derive
predictions – which is the bulk of what neoclassical economists do.26 This inherent
weakness of this field of scientific enquiry perhaps provided the initial impetus for the
neoclassical school’s refuge in abstract mathematical models, their dubious applicability
to the real world notwithstanding.
Another way for economists to make a case for one policy prescription over
another is to find a correlation between the advocated policy and a desired result in
statistical records.27 Although economists try to isolate independent variables as best
they can using statistical techniques, their efforts are subject to the dictum that while
correlation, especially very strong correlation, mayseem to imply causation, it can never
prove it. For example, it seems to me that about 80% of the time when I enter a subway
station (100% of the time when I am in a hurry), the train I wish to take is in the process
of leaving the station. Therefore there is a very strong positive correlation between my
entering a subway station and the train I want to take leaving it; yet it goes without saying
that my daily movements do not determine the movement and position of subway
trains.28 Do not blame me should you miss your train: correlation is not causation. This
basic scientific principle should be kept in mind whenever economists identify two
variables, note a correlation between the two, and then proceed to argue that one caused
the other.
V
Support for the propositions that the harmonization of IP law internationally
(through the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) or bilateral treaties) will either improve or stanch economic growth in the
developing world comes in many forms. The weakest support comes in the form of
25

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (U.S. 1993).
See Dominique Peters, On Modeling in Human Geography, in THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF MODELS,
163 (Robert Franck ed., Springer 2002).
27
See, for example, David M. Gould and William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in
Economic Growth, 48 J. of Dev. Econ. 323, 336, 338 (1996).
28
This is an illustration I borrowed from a since forgotten book. Although I cannot remember to whom
credit should be given, I will note that this is not my idea.
26

armchair theorizing and anecdotal evidence.29 Relatively stronger support comes in the
form of modeling, and stronger still in finding positive correlations between IP protection
and economic growth from comparisons of statistical samples.
A few examples of the modeling approach provide a demonstration of one
critique of neoclassical economics: that the theoretical tools its practitioners have
developed may be of little or no value in terms of application to the real world. This is
not to say that no model could possibly provide evidence either for or against a link
between IP protection and economic growth in developing countries, but only to remind
participants in the debate to be vigilant in judging the utility and applicability of
modeling. In 1993, Elhanan Helpman designed a model that demonstrated howstronger
IP protection would be harmful to the developing world both in the absence and presence
of foreign direct investment (FDI).30 Building upon and modifying Helpman’s work,
Edwin Lai later designed a model that demonstrated that, in the presence of sufficient
FDI (in the form of multi-national corporations (MNCs) relocating production to
developing countries), stronger IP protection would lead to a higher rate of innovation
and higher wages in the developing world.31 A recent minor revision of the models of
Helpman and Lai – tweaking just the definition of knowledge capital to make it more
realistic – resulted in “completely opposite” conclusions on the effect of strengthening IP
protection on economic growth.32 If entirely different policy prescriptions can be
supported from the results of minute tweaks within largely similar models, perhaps
theoretical arguments derived from modeling used by both sides in the IP and
development debate should be taken with a grain, or more, of salt.
With that in mind, another model predicted that strengthening IP rights in
developing countries would increase one element of their international trade: their
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See generally, e.g., SHAHID ALIKHAN, SOCIO-ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (WIPO 2000).
30
See Elhanan Helpman, Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights, 61 Econometrica 1247,
1274 (1993). Helpman also notes the limitations of theoretical arguments in the IP & development debate.
Id., at 1257.
31
See Edwin Lai, International Intellectual Property Rights Protection and the Rate of Product Innovation,
55 J. of Dev. Econ. 133, 144-147 (1996).
32
See Debasis Mondal & Manash Ranjan Gupta, Product Development, Imitation, and Economic Growth:
A Note, 15 J. of Int’l Trade & Econ. Dev. 27, 40-41 (2006).

imports.33 Keith Maskus, one of the authors of this study, reviewed it later, and added
that strengthened IP rights should cause industrializing countries which pose an imitation
threat to import more high-technology goods – “which may have a beneficial growth
impact”34 (an explanation of the causal link was not provided). However, the economies
of “poor countries without much ability to imitate … could be exposed to monopoly
impacts with negative effects on their terms of trade.”35 A subsequent modeling exercise
found similar results, but its authors pointed out methodological flaws in the first
(Maskus & Penubarti) study,36 and concluded that due to methodological problems and
the theoretical ambiguity of economic analyses of the effect of IP protection on trade,
“natural experiments” should be isolated and studied instead.37
It is worth noting in passing that an evolutionary approach to modeling has been
applied to the broader question of the social and technological efficiency of stronger IP
protection. The results of this evolutionary model weighed in favor of mild patent laws
in developed countries, as stronger patent systems were shown to lower social welfare
and technical progress.38 However, while evolutionary economic models may be a step
up from traditional modeling, the jury is still out on their usefulness. Other sources of
evidence must be examined.
VI
One argument in favor of the harmonization of international IP laws is that, even
if such harmonization does not stimulate innovation and economic growth in developing
countries directly, it will draw FDI into developing countries with newly strengthened IP
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See Keith E. Maskus & Mohan Penubarti, How Trade-Related Are Intellectual Property Rights?, 39 J.
Int’l Econ. 227, 235-37, 244 (1995).
34
See Keith E. Maskus, Lessons from Studying the International Economics of Intellectual Property Rights,
53 Vand. L. Rev. 2219, 2232 (2000).
35
Id.
36
See, e.g., How Stronger Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Affects International Trade Flows, at
10-12, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2051, WPS2051 (Carsten Fink & Carlos A. Primo
Braga, February 1999)[hereinafter How IPR Affects Trade].
37
See id., at 12. See infra text accompanying notes 86-105.
38
See Thomas Vallee & Murat Yildizoglu, Social and Technological Efficiency of Patent Systems, at 11, 11
Cahiers du Groupement de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, available at
http://repec.org/sce2004/up.16143.1075828575.pdf (May 2004).

protection:39 and this, in turn, will stimulate economic growth. (Although not even this
last link in the argument is uncontroversial,40 I will assume its correctness for the
purposes of this section.)
One recent study of countries who signed bilateral trade agreements including
strengthened IP protection found a positive correlation between FDI and newlystrengthened IP rights among a number of other factors, including a common language
and geographical proximity, in countries having weak legal institutions prior to the
signing of the treaty.41 Paradoxically, countries having “perfect” institutions experienced
no or even negative growth in FDI after the signing of the treaty.42
The study did not attempt to disaggregate FDI by industry, however. The
importance of industry disaggregation for generating useful results was demonstrated by
a subsequent study of the Hollywood video and film export industry. A firm-level focus
was chosen for the reasons that the firm is the unit of analysis in theoretical work on the
issue, and that country-level empirical studies blur differences between individual
industries in their sensitivity to changes in IP law. The study found thatthe degree of IP
protection had a varied effect across different markets; in markets with high and low IP
protection, FDI was higher, whereas in countries with mid-level IP protection, FDI was
foregone in place of licensing agreements. This finding weighs against the hypothesis
that FDI goes up uniformlyas IP protection is strengthened. The true relationship is
more complex.43
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A 2003 study on the relationship between IP rights and FDI attempted to avoid
the same problems identified in the previous study by disaggregating the analysis of the
relationship between IP protection and FDI on sectoral and regional levels.44 The studies
also used the most recent patent index available, which, because based on a survey of
perceived IP protection in a number of countries, might provide a better idea of how
effective actual enforcement of IP laws is. Prior indexes relied exclusively on how strong
were the IP laws on the books, without regard to enforcement. The results demonstrated
that the relationship between FDI and IP protection is heavily mediated by both industryand host country-specific characteristics. IP protection was positively correlated with
FDI in the machinery and transport equipment industries, but not with the food, metal,
and chemicals industries. Furthermore, IP protection has a weak relationship to FDI in
markets with strong “pull factors” for investment. The results suggest that FDI
significantly increases with stronger IP protection only where local imitative capacity
(represented by educational attainment) is moderate. In countries with poor educational
systems, no significant effect of IP protection on FDI was found; likewise with very
advanced countries, where licensing is largely substituted for FDI.45 The findings seem
in accord with arguments based on the historical relationship of IP protection and
economic development, dealt with below.
Past surveys of MNCs have demonstrated that the IP rights regime of a particular
country is “highly relevant” in decisions to invest in R&D facilities abroad, “moderately
important” for FDI in manufacturing, and “of limited relevance” for investments in sales
and distribution outlets.46 However, the most recent survey of MNCs clarified these
results by differentiating between decisions to invest in developed or developing
countries. This study revealed that in decisions to invest in R&D facilities in emerging
economies, IP protection ranked after all of the following: growth potential in the market
(the most important consideration), which was followed in second place by quality of
44
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R&D personnel, while tied for third were costs (net of tax breaks), the ease of
collaborating with universities, and the expertise of university faculty.47 Only in
decisions regarding investment of R&D facilities in developed economies was the quality
of IP protection a top priority.48 Therefore, arguments49 that the international
harmonization of IP law will lead to an increase in FDI for developing countries do not
stand up to the latest evidence from surveys of MNC investment decisions. Before IP
laws have any effect on such decisions, developing countries would have to demonstrate
growth potential in their markets, invest heavily in educating future R&D personnel,
ensure low costs (via tax breaks if necessary), invest heavily in their university systems
and facilitate collaboration between industry and the academy. Rather than strong IP
protection being a reason why MNCs may invest in developing countries, this survey
reveals IP protection to be merely the icing on the cake: insubstantial in comparison to
the factors listed above.50 These findings go a long way towards explaining, for example,
why rampant piracy in China has not stopped a veritable flood of FDI from inundating
the country.51
VII
Another potential benefit of stronger IP laws for developing countries may be an
increase in formal technology transfers – especially the transfer by MNCs to their
developing country subsidiaries of production facilities producing technologically
advanced goods. In the process, local engineers and other skilled workers would be
taught the key elements of MNCs’ production processes, thereby diffusing advanced
technologies in the developing world. This, in turn, is presumed to increase technological
improvement and growth by means of ripple effects throughout the host economy.
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One study of U.S. firms on the effect of increased IP protection in a mixed sample
of developed and developing countries on royalty payments, R&D expenditures, and
foreign patent applications (used as proxies for technology transfer) found a significant,
positive correlation.52 These results may suggest that U.S. firms respond to the
strengthening of IP rights regimes by increasing technology transfer to reforming
countries. However, the samples used were biased rather than random, since Argentina,
China, and Japan were excluded on the basis of the authors’ perception of factors in those
countries that might skew the results.53 The authors also noted that the correlation they
found might be explained by different sources of causation, and though they were unable
to rule this possibility out, they argued that some suggested alternative causes were
unlikely to explain the correlation found.54 However, the authors hedged in their results
by noting that they did not demonstrate that increased IP protection was welfare
enhancing for reforming countries – for one, locally-owned firms may be displacedby an
increased MNC presence, which may lead to an overall welfare reduction as a result of
increased IP protection.55
Another study separated a random sample of countries into three groups based on
per capita income, and measured the relationship between IP rights policy and trade
openness on the one hand, and productivity growth and technology transfer (using levels
of international trade, foreign patenting, and the postulate that disembodied technology
diffuses at a rate increasing with the technology gap between leading and following
countries and with the human capital level of the following countries as proxies) on the
other.56 (Unfortunately, the index of patent protection used accounted only for de jure,
not de facto levels of protection.)57 The authors found thatthe number of foreign patents
filed was correlated with technology spillover effects (increases in productivity) in lowand middle-income countries, but less so in high-income countries; in middle- and high52

See Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Increase International Technology Transfer?, at 25,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 11516 (Lee Branstetter, Raymond Fisman & C.
Fritz Foley, July 2005).
53
Id., at 18, 20.
54
Id., at 21-24.
55
Id., at 25.
56
See Bin Xu & Eric P. Chang, Trade, Patents and International Technology Diffusion, 14 J. Int. Trade &
Econ. Dev. 115, 115-116 (2005).
57
Id., at 118. For an explanation of the importance of de facto v.de jure IP protection in this context, see
How IPR Affects Trade, supra note 36, at 12, and infra text accompanying notes 44
- 45.

income (but not low-income) countries, increases in imported capital goods (embodying
foreign technology) were correlated with productivity growth.58 This, in light of the
result that the number of domestic patents filed was not significantly correlated with
productivity growth in developing countries, suggestthat domestic technological
innovation in developing countries is minimal and an insignificant source for productivity
gains.59
Therefore, from a policy perspective, it would seem better to ensure that
developing countries have unimpeded access to technology transfer whether by formal or
informal means (the latter requiring either weak or unenforced IP protection), rather than
to ensure that the laws of developing countries are such as to promote domestic
innovation (arguably, by strong, enforced IP protection). The postulate that disembodied
technology diffusion, or informal technology transfer, increases with the technology gap
between leading and following countries and with levels of human capital was supported
by the results.60 In other words, informal technology transfer occurs regardless of the
presence of formal technology transfer, in proportion to the level of human capital in the
technology-following country. This finding suggests that developing countries may be
better off investing in education than in stronger IP rights, since an improved educational
system increases both the rate of informal technology transfer and levels of FDI.61
Moreover, while technology transfer from developed country MNCs to their
developing country subsidiaries may occur through formal channels in some industries, a
recent report by the World Health Organization notes that formal technology transfer to
developing countries for “manufacturing medicines, and, particularly, active ingredients,
is scant or nonexistent.”62 It would seem that in the pharmaceutical context, and perhaps
in others as well, only informal means of technology transfer are available. If, as some
have argued, informal means of technology transfer (such as reverse engineering,
imitation and adaptation of advanced technologies) is a more important source of
58
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technology transfer than formal means, then IP laws that restrict the former in the hope of
increasing the latter may actually decrease overall technology transfer.63 Clearly, more
research disaggregating among industries, countries by level of development, and
technology transfer both formal and informal, is needed.
VIII
While encouraging FDI and technology transfer are goals prominent in arguments
for the harmonization of international IP law, they are but means to the end stronger IP
law is purported to achieve: economic growth. We will examine empirical findings on
the relationship between the stronger IP laws and economic growth in this section.
One empirical study comparing the relationship of IP protection to economic
growth (while controlling for a number of other variables) found a positive correlation
between the two.64 This result was hedged in by a number of qualifications, however.
One anomalous initial result was that countries with the highest level of patent protection
grew fastest, but countries with the second-lowest level of patent protection grew faster
than countries with intermediate levels of patent protection.65 After controlling for
important determinates of growth, the authors found a partial correlation between growth
and IP protection, but with a high degree of variation in the relationship.66 After
controlling for ancillary variables, the significance level of IP protection was still
significant, but dropped enough for the authors to question the importance of IP
protection for economic growth.67 In conclusion, the authors noted that IP protection
may positively influence economic growth, but that the level of competitiveness and
openness to trade within a country mediated the economic effect of stronger IP
protection.68
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The authors provided an example of this effect by a comparison, writing that IP
protection induces more growth in “open,” “outward-oriented” economies like South
Korea, than in more “closed” economies like Jamaica, a country with more trade
“distortions.”69 The statistical technique of instrumental variables was used to isolate the
effect of IP laws from a myriad of other variables. But how successful were the
instrumental variables the authors chose in insulating the analysis from, for example,
distortions imposed by the Cold War? Korea was benefited greatly from the Cold War;
not only did the U.S. give massive amounts of aid funds to South Korea during its postwar period of development,70 but Korean exporters got an open door to the richest market
in the world.71 Needless to say, as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, Jamaica
reaped no such largesse. The Cold War variable might explain why, although Korea and
Jamaica both ranked a 4 on the index of patent protection used by the authors (which
does not factor in actual enforcement), Korea used semi-legal and illegal means of
technology transfer72 without fear of incurring trade sanctions - facilitated, unlike
Jamaica, by the fact that historically “[t]he United States was willing to indulge certain
countries, especially places like Korea sitting on the fault lines of the Cold War.”73
To move from the specific to the general, how can one be sure that the direction
of causality runs from IP protection to economic growth, and not the other way around?
Perhaps, as proponents of the history-based arguments below might say, the positive
correlation between IP protection and economic growth can be explained in this manner:
once a country with weak IP protection reaches a certain threshold of development where
its IP-dependent industries have become internationally competitive, it tends to
implement stronger IP laws to protect its industries. In other words, economic growth
causes (rather, provides a basis for) stronger IP protection. The study’s authors might
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counter that this endogeneity-based criticism is misplaced, since patent laws for most
countries in the sample (except for some very notable exceptions: Mexico, Korea,
Taiwan, and China) were established during or before the 1960s, while the dependent
variable (economic growth) is based on later data.74 However, there is an important
difference between de facto and de jure patent protection that the patent index the authors
used does not capture75 – and this gap makes the authors’ conclusion more vulnerable to
the historical criticism just mentioned. IP laws may be on the books but largely
unenforced during a period where a country’s industry is not yet internationally
competitive.76
The countries sampled in the previous study ran the gamut from the United States
to Zambia to Malaysia, encompassing least developed, developing, and developed
nations. In a subsequent, methodologically similar study investigating the relationship of
IP protection to innovation and economic growth, samples were split between developed
and developing countries.77 An improved patent index was used that covers broader
categories of patent protection.78 The results of this study suggested that IP rights have a
stronger impact on domestic innovation in developed nations, while negatively impacting
innovation in developing countries.79 These results, the author writes, “may be indicative
of the fact that most innovation in developing countries may actually be imitation or
adaptive in nature. Therefore, providing stronger IPRs protects foreign firms at the
expense of local firms.”80 This is not to say that IP protection should be unequivocally
discouraged in developing countries, but that developed countries must support R&D
activities in the developing world in order for IP protection to pay off for the latter.81 If
this does not occur, increased IP protection may harm rather than help developing
economies.
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In one of the few studies examining the effects of IP protection on development to
note the essential distinction between correlation and causation, the results of an
exhaustive, highly disaggregated data analysis suggested that there may actually be a
strong non-linearity describing the relationship between IP protection and economic
growth. Strong IP protection is probably beneficial for countries with a high degree of
industrial sophistication, but below a certain threshold, strong IP protection is far less
likely to have any positive impact on economic growth.82 This threshold may be a per
capita income of $7,750 (in 1985 dollars), which is the turning point on the U-shaped
relationship between the strength of IP protection and income levels revealed by
econometric cross-section evidence.83 Therefore, there does not seem to be much of a
case for expanding strong IP protection uniformlyacross the developing world ; rather,
differentiated levels of IP protection should be applied with sensitivity toward levels of
economic and technological sophistication.84 It could be that slack IP protection is useful
to facilitate informal technology transfer; once these means succeed in building local
capacity, then local innovative effort becomes possible, and at this point IP protection can
be of assistance.85 The history of IP law and economic development may provide a
“natural experiment” to test this proposition.
IX
The lack of a clear consensus as regards policy prescriptions coming from the
theoretical and empirical work discussed above is troubling. A transformative quest to
harmonize international IP law would have, or so one would hope, a comfortably solid
bedrock of empirical evidence to support it. No one would trust an airplane whose safety
record is mixed and a significant proportion of mechanics say is dangerous to take them
to their desired destination. In the face of the contradictory results of theory and
empirical study, prudent passengers of the global economy may want to look to past
experience for guidance. And whereas theoretical analyses and empirical studies of data
82
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of the interactions within the most complex of human complex systems, economies, are
easily confounded, historical studies are relatively less susceptible.86
The most succinct exposition of the conventional wisdom (in the original,
Galbraithian sense)87 on the historical relationship of IP protection to economic
development, comes from the National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade: “The
historical record in the industrialized countries, which began as developing countries,
demonstrates that intellectual property protection has been one of the most powerful
instruments for economic development, export growth and the diffusion of new
technologies, art and culture.”88 To the extent that the past practices of developed
countries can helpfully inform current policy on IP law for developing nations, it will be
useful to examine the accuracy of this historical claim.
In his work on development strategies in historical perspective, Cambridge
economist Ha-Joon Chang has positively skewered this bit of conventional wisdom.89
Chang’s work reveals that when the now-developed countries (NDCs) were at a stage of
development corresponding in terms of per capita income to the stage of development
developing countries are currently at, the former had much weaker IP protection than that
which is urged on the latter in the current debate. Furthermore, facilitated by weak IP
laws, the NDCs made extensive use of what would now be considered piracy and other
forms of IP theft as a means of technology transfer, which was instrumental in fueling
their technological and economic development. In this context, the current stance of the
developed countries with regards to pressuring developing countries to adopt stronger,
“modern” levels of IP protection seems a brazen attempt to, in the words of nineteenthcentury German economist Friedrich List, “kick away the ladder.”90
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In the early days of industrialization prior to the mid-19th century, technological
knowledge was embodied in skilled workers. Tours of factories, apprenticeships, and
most of all the transfer of skilled workers were the dominant means of technology
transfer between European states and between Europe and the U.S.91 This was done
legally until Britain and the Netherlands became worried that their technological edge
was slipping in the face of these means of technology transfer, and consequently
introduced bans on the export of machinery and “suborning,” the recruiting of skilled
workers from abroad.92 In contravention of these laws, less advanced European states
initiated government-sponsored efforts at industrial espionage and the suborning of
skilled workers, backed up by government policies to enhance domestic technological
capabilities.93
The first patent laws were adopted by most NDCs between 1790 and 1850,
though they were highly deficient in comparison to the standards required by TRIPS; for
example, most of them did not provide for product, as opposed to process, patents,
meaning that chemical and pharmaceutical substances could be copied so long as the
production process involved was different from the patented process. Most importantly,
these patent laws afforded very little protection for the IP rights of foreigners.94 In the
middle of this period (1820), only Australia, the Netherlands and the UK had achieved
per capita income of between $1,500 and $2,000 (in 1990 dollars); the bulk of the NDCs
had yet to achieve a per capita income of $1,500. This stage of development, measured
by per capita income, is matched in the modern era by developing countries like Ghana
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($1,007), Nigeria ($1,152), and Pakistan ($1,642).95 Of course, the per capita income of
the NDCs today is many, many times that of the developing countries.
A mention of this disparity becomes important when analyzing the emergence of
patent laws: by the time a majority of NDCs had some form of patent law – what could
be considered the first period of international IP law harmonization - there was no greater
difference between the richest and the poorest participating nations than a few thousand
dollars in terms of per capita income.96 During the contemporary period of IP law
harmonization, on the other hand, there are tens of thousands of dollars separating the per
capita income of the richest and the poorest participating nations.
Towards the end of the 19th century, even after a number of international
conventions that partially succeeded at harmonizing extant IP laws, some of the most
advanced nations still routinely violated the IP rights of foreigners.97 Also, the
harmonization achieved at the Paris Convention of 1883 included both compulsory
working and compulsory licensing provisions, and a non-reciprocity approach – foreign
patent holders got national treatment for their IP, not the treatment they would have been
afforded in their own country.98 Of the three, only compulsory licensing made it into
TRIPS and the latest round of IP law harmonization. In other words, as the NDCs slowly
developed, increasing their per capita income from the level of modern Morocco, to Peru,
to Turkey, to Brazil, to Mexico, and so on, they had a great deal more latitude in
designing IP laws that corresponded with their needs than do modern developing
countries.
Given that the first rounds of international IP law harmonization were only
partial, and marked differences in IP law between nations existed well into the 20th
century, this historical period is ripe with opportunities for “natural experiments.”99

95

See CHANG, KICKING, supra note 89, at 122-123.
See id., at 118-119. The NDCs for which information was available were: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg and Saxony), Italy (Sardinia
and the Vatican State), Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK, and USA.
97
See Chang, IPR & Development, supra note 63, at 292. One prominent violator was the U.S., whose
copyright protection did not extend to foreign owners until 1891, and did not fully comply with the Berne
Convention of 1886 until 1988.
98
Id.
99
See supra text accompanying note 37.
96

The example provided by Switzerland offers some interesting observations.100
Switzerland did not provide any IP protection until 1888, and then only by a patent law
exclusively covering mechanical inventions. German pressure, motivated by the Swiss
use of its chemical and pharmaceutical IP, forced Switzerland in 1907 to modify its
patent law to match those of its neighbors. Even then, Swiss IP law featured a number of
exceptions, including a refusal to allow chemical substance patents; Swiss law became
comparable to other advanced countries in 1954, though chemical substance patents were
not recognized until 1978.101 The results of the Swiss historical experience with IP
protection tends to strengthen the hypothesis that patent laws have little effect on both
innovation and development.102 Despite having had no patent law whatsoever until 1888
and no patent law worth the name until 1907, Switzerland was one of the most innovative
countries in the world in the late 19th century. The introduction of the 1907 patent law
produced no noticeable increase in inventive activities. Neither did weak IP protection in
Switzerland deter FDI; in fact, in some cases weak IP protection was a major factor in
drawing in certain types of FDI. On balance, weak IP protection in Switzerland actually
helped its industrial development, especially in the dye, chemical, and electro-technical
industries.103
One final example of another “natural experiment” lies with Japan. The National
Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade reasons that Japan’s pharmaceutical industry
was “retarded by the delay in introducing product protection for pharmaceuticals until
1976,” until which point the Japanese pharmaceutical industry could develop and grow
on the basis of copying foreign drugs and then producing them using a different process.
According to Japan’s Management and Coordination Agency, after the introduction of
product patent protection in 1976 the technology trade balance of the Japanese
pharmaceutical industry rapidly improved, and has been in surplus since 1986.104 This
could be explained as the result of stronger IP protection providing a stimulus to
100

Somewhat paradoxically, Switzerland is now the home of the World Intellectual Property Organization
See Chang, IPR & Development, supra note 63, at 292.
102
Id., at 296-297 (citing ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS – THE
NETHERLANDS 1869-1912 AND SWITZERLAND, 1850-1907 (Princeton University Press 1971) and Robert E.
Evenson, Survey of Empirical Studies, in Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing
Countries, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 112, WDP-112 (Wolfgang E. Siebeck ed., December 1990).
103
Id. (citing SCHIFF, supra note 102).
104
See Strong Intellectual Property Protection Benefits the Developing Countries, supra note 88.
101

innovation. On the other hand, it might also be interpreted as a decision by the Japanese
government to allow its pharmaceutical industry greater exposure to international
competition after it had been sufficiently developed under a more protectionist regime to
face such competition on equal terms. Also, Japanese enforcement of its own patent laws
has been noted to be deficient in some high profile areas related to IP rights of foreign
citizens. 105 This leads one to doubt that the Japanese experience can support the
hypothesis that strong IP protection (which Japan arguably does not apply impartially)
leads to economic growth.
X
In light of the historical record, the proposition that strengthening IP protection
inexorably leads toward economic growth seems decidedly dubious. Are countries
without a comparative advantage in high tech industries (in other words, just about the
entire developing world) to adopt potentially growth-stifling IP policies106 on faith and
the contradictory and, even when positive, heavily qualified advice of economists? Or
would they rather attempt to follow the only historical examples applicable to their own
current levels of economic and technological development?
When it was a developing country with a per capita income of $100, South Korea
surely had a comparative advantage in the production of kimchi – but little else. Thanks
in large part to its relationship with the U.S., its development strategy and the illegitimate
means of technology transfer it used, South Korea is now developed. So too did
European states and the U.S. engage in what would now be considered piracy and IP theft
during the periods of their development corresponding in per capita income terms to the
stage of development that developing countries are at today.
Perhaps the only counterargument readily available is the fact that neither is weak
IP protection a surefire stimulus to economic growth, in the absence of many other
factors. This is apparent enough from the simple observation that most of the world’s
countries are poor, and most of the world’s countries had weak IP protection until
recently. However, the argument has yet to be made (perhaps because the work of Ha105
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Joon Chang and others has been overlooked) by proponents of international IP law
harmonization that changed circumstances, whether technological, political or other,
make the historical argument outlined above moot.
Praise of TRIPS and international IP law harmonization as a boon for
development should be kept within bounds. There exists a patently superior system, from
an economist’s point of view,if economic growth for the develop ing world while
incentivizing innovation is the goal to be achieved. This would be for the developed
world to grant national treatment to foreign inventors from the developing world without
demanding reciprocity.107 A more equitable (in terms of parity of national treatment) and
natural system would be for each nation to protect its own innovators, and for countries to
exchange spillover benefits.108 This describes, by and large, the system of IP protection
existing in Europe and the United States until about the end of the 19th century.109
If these alternatives seem preposterous, it should be noted that it is only the
constraints of current political economy which make them seem so. From a purely
economic perspective, the latter two options would lead to better outcomes for the
developing world. It is only because developed countries would refuse to be the sole
providers of IP rights, accepting an outflow of profit to the developing world and
deadweight losses for itself with Christian charity and heroic forbearance, that
harmonization of IP law has become the regime of choice of the developed world.110 By
way of clarification, not condemnation, it is important for the intellectually honest
observer to note that international harmonization of IP law is not the best solution for the
developing world, considerations of political economy aside. One can still argue that it
will have net positive effects on developing economies (though it may be exceedingly
difficult to do so in light of the discussion above), but one cannot in good faith argue that
it is the ideal regime for the developing world to adopt.
And where do we arrive at the conclusion of this discussion? Perhaps with an
acknowledgement that reasoned debate alone will not decide the issue. Politics will. If
philosopher-kings ruled the world, debate would govern. But being as it is that the world
107
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is governed by more or less democratic governments, and philosopher-status being a de
facto bar to leadership thereof, those of us forming “the small number of thinking beings
scattered throughout the world”111 can hope at most to influence the debate by clarifying
the issues, examining the evidence, and most of all, exposing as popular falsehood the
conventional wisdom. May the debate continue, develop, and most of all, influence the
real world outcome.
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